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A Proposal for Early Impact,
Persistent, and Cost-Effective
Job Creation Policies
D
ue to the recession, the U.S.
economy has lost over 10 million jobs.
Job creation rarely receives the focus
it deserves in fiscal stimulus proposals,
either in the one that has already been
enacted or in many of the proposals
currently being considered.
Job creation deserves greater focus
because joblessness has large long-run
economic costs. Because conventional
fiscal stimulus does not focus on
job creation—job creation is only a
byproduct of boosting gross domestic
product (GDP)—this fiscal stimulus
is relatively costly per job created. As
a result, current and proposed fiscal
stimulus cannot create enough jobs at
politically acceptable costs to meet the
current job needs in the United States. If
we are to sufficiently address these needs
without overly adding to the budget
deficit, we need to make job creation
a central goal of a new fiscal stimulus
package. This package must have a low
cost per job created, address near-term
job needs, and have persistent effects
over the next several years.
Why Creating Jobs Is as Important as
Generating GDP
Much of the debate over fiscal
stimulus focuses on GDP multiplier
effects. The number of jobs created
receives less attention.

Job creation deserves special focus
because of the enormous costs of
joblessness in the long run. Joblessness
erodes the unemployed’s self-confidence
and job skills, and damages their
reputations with employers. Lengthy
unemployment reduces a worker’s
employment rates and wage rates in
the long run.1 Therefore, combating the
recession should place a great emphasis
on creating jobs, not just on boosting
GDP. The long-run productivity of
many workers and the economy will be
enhanced by antirecession policies that
stress job creation, even if they do not
have greater effects on GDP.

The Need for Immediate and Persistent
Job Creation Policies
If joblessness damages long-run
economic prospects, then the current
recession is a disaster with long-run
consequences. Losing millions of jobs
not only imposes current pain, it also
damages long-run economic productivity.
Since the start of the recession in
December 2007, the employment-topopulation ratio has dropped from 62.7
percent to 58.2 percent (as of December
2009). To restore employment conditions
to prerecession levels, the economy
would need an additional 10.7 million
jobs.
Even though GDP has begun to
recover, the labor market will likely have
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large employment deficits for the next
several years. In the last two recessions,
employment-to-population rates did not
increase from their trough level by more
than 0.2 percent for more than two and a
half years after the recovery in GDP had
begun. If our current recovery in GDP
began in mid-2009, history suggests that
the employment-to-population ratio will
not rise significantly above its current
level until the beginning of 2012. One
study finds that the U.S. economy will
be short of 2007 employment rates by
10.7 million jobs in 2010, 8.5 million
jobs in 2011, and 5.1 million jobs in 2012
(Schmitt and Baker 2009). Other analysts
project that it will be seven years before
unemployment rates dip below 5 percent
(Baily 2009; Thoma 2009).
These employment deficits are
occurring despite the $787 billion fiscal
stimulus package passed in February
2009. The stimulus package is helping,
but it is insufficient. Estimates from the
Council of Economic Advisers (2009a,
2010) suggest that the stimulus has added
over 1.5 million jobs so far and that it
may add another 2 million jobs by the
end of 2010. But the employment deficit
numbers given above are after these job
creation effects. Without the stimulus, we
would be short even more jobs.
Targeted Job Creation Policies
Are More Cost-Effective Than
Conventional Fiscal Stimulus Policies
These large employment deficits are
difficult to reduce through conventional
fiscal stimulus, which focuses on reviving
demand for goods and services through
tax cuts or increased public spending.
Job creation is a by-product of reviving
demand. More targeted job creation
policies, which directly increase jobs
relative to GDP, are much less costly per
job.
In the $787 billion fiscal stimulus
package, the average cost of creating
one job per year was $112,000. Tax cuts
are estimated to cost $145,000 per job
created, state fiscal relief is estimated to
cost $117,000 per job created, and direct
federal government spending is estimated
to cost $92,000 per job created (Council
of Economic Advisers 2009a). The “Cash
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for Clunkers” program has an estimated
cost per job created of $86,000 (Council
of Economic Advisers 2009b). “Cash
for Caulkers” is estimated to have a cost
per job created of $80,000 (Hendricks
et al. 2009). Increases in unemployment
benefits have an estimated cost per job
created of around $95,000.2
With costs of about $100,000 per
job created, it is difficult to have a
conventional fiscal stimulus package
large enough to significantly reduce
our employment deficits.3 Suppose
we wanted to create 5 million jobs in
2010 and 4 million jobs in 2011, which
would address a little less than half of
the expected employment deficits in
those years. At a cost per job created of
$100,000, the fiscal stimulus package
necessary to reach these job goals would
total another $900 billion. But the new
fiscal stimulus/job creation packages that
are thought to be currently politically

The current and proposed
fiscal stimulus plans cannot
create enough jobs at
politically acceptable costs
to meet the current job
needs in the United States.
feasible are much smaller. For example,
in December 2009 the U.S. House of
Representatives passed by only five
votes a $154 billion jobs/fiscal stimulus
package. Perhaps a bigger stimulus
package can be considered, but a package
close to the size of the original stimulus
seems politically implausible.
Targeted job creation policies are more
cost-effective than conventional fiscal
stimulus because these targeted policies
encourage employers to increase the ratio
of jobs to GDP. Targeted job creation
policies are around three times as costeffective as conventional fiscal stimulus:
$35,000 per job versus $100,000. The
recent Job Creation Tax Credit proposal,
which would provide employers with a
wage subsidy for payroll expansions, has
a gross cost per job created of $29,000
(Bartik and Bishop 2009). One public
service jobs program, the Minnesota
Emergency Employment Development
program (MEED), has a gross cost per

job created of $34,000 (Bartik 2009).
Other public service jobs proposals have
a gross cost per job created of $40,000
(Economic Policy Institute 2009). Finally,
“work sharing” proposals (Abraham
and Houseman 2009), which encourage
employers to reduce working hours rather
than lay off workers, have a gross cost
per job saved of $32,000 (Baker 2009).
The net costs of job creation programs
will be reduced because more jobs and
greater GDP will increase tax revenues
and reduce social spending. Targeted
job creation proposals may have fiscal
benefits of about $20,000 per job created
(Bartik and Bishop 2009), which reduces
the net cost to about $15,000 per job
created. Due to larger effects on GDP,
conventional fiscal stimulus will have
larger fiscal benefits: $40,000 per job
created.4 Net costs of conventional fiscal
stimulus per job created will then be
around $60,000, but targeted job creation
is still four times as effective in creating
jobs, per dollar of net costs.
Options for a Job Creation Package
A possible stimulus package targeted
only at job creation could include three
components: 1) tax credits for employers
creating jobs, 2) payments to employers
for work sharing, and 3) public service
job creation (see Table 1). This package
would aim to create 5 million jobs in
2010 and 4 million jobs in 2011, filling a
little less than half of the expected jobs
deficit in each year. The gross cost of
this package, as counted by the Office
of Management and Budget and the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO),
would be $276 billion, with a little over
half of that for 2010. However, after
accounting for the package’s effects in
increasing tax revenue and reducing
social spending, the net cost of this twoyear package would be only $108 billion.
The gross cost per job created is around
$30,000; the net cost is about $12,000.
Compared to the original fiscal
stimulus of $787 billion, this job creation
stimulus would have a gross cost only
one-third as much. However, it would
create 9 million “job-years” (5 million
in 2010, 4 million in 2011)—about
one-third greater than the original fiscal
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creation policies should be a major part
of any new fiscal stimulus package.

Table 1 A Possible Jobs Package
Year

Job creation
tax credit

2010
2011
Two-year total

2.8
2.3
5.1

1.3
0.7
2.0

0.9
1.0
1.9

5.0
4.0
9.0

Gross costs ($, billions)

2010
2011
Two-year total

80
67
147

43
21
64

31
34
65

154
122
276

Net costs ($, billions)

2010
2011
Two-year total

13
14
27

30
15
45

17
19
36

60
48
108

Effect analyzed
Jobs created (millions)

Job sharing Public service
tax credit
employment

Total

NOTE: Gross costs are costs as counted by budget agencies, without allowing for any effects of
programs on job creation and GDP generation. Net costs allow for estimated increases in jobs
and GDP and resulting effects on tax revenue and social spending.
SOURCE: Estimated effects for the Job Creation Tax Credit are from Bartik and Bishop (2009);
for work sharing, Baker (2009); for public service jobs programs, my unpublished estimates for
MEED (see Bartik [2009] and references therein).

stimulus’s estimated effect of creating 6.8
million “job-years.” (One job created for
one year is one “job-year.”) About half
of the package would be a tax credit for
employers adding to payroll, one-quarter
would go to subsidies encouraging
employers to offer work sharing, and
one-quarter would go to the creation of
public service jobs.
Tax credits for job creation and
subsidies for work sharing could very
quickly be put into effect. And contrary
to some comments (McArdle 2009),
it is feasible to expand public service
jobs quite quickly to the 1.1 million
job slots of this package.5 During the
Great Depression, the Civil Works
Administration created 4.3 million jobs
in two months, and the Works Progress
Administration created 2.7 million
jobs within eight months (Kesselman
1978; Howard 1943). More recently,
in 1983 MEED created the equivalent
nationally of 500,000 jobs within six
months.6 Rapid public service job
creation is quite feasible if government
administrators are given strong
incentives to reach job creation goals in
a timely fashion.
What if policymakers want fiscal
stimulus to also achieve other goals in
addition to job creation? For example,
they may also want to extend access
to unemployment benefits or maintain
state and local public services. A fiscal

stimulus package can also achieve
these goals, but only at higher costs
or some sacrifice of job creation. We
could add $100 billion to the package
in conventional fiscal stimulus, which
at $100,000 per job would create about
1 million jobs. We could then still
create 9 million jobs if we reduced job
creation stimulus to $246 billion. The
fiscal stimulus package would then have
to be $346 billion to achieve the same
job creation goals. Alternatively, we

Targeted job creation policies
are around three times as
cost effective as conventional
fiscal stimulus: $35,000
per job versus $100,000.
could keep the overall package at $276
billion by letting the $100 billion in
conventional fiscal stimulus replace $100
billion in targeted job creation stimulus.
But then the package’s job creation
would be lowered from 9 million jobs to
6.7 million jobs.
Policymakers must decide the
importance of job creation versus other
goals of fiscal stimulus. If it is important
to create a significant number of jobs at
politically feasible costs—and economic
research suggests that short-term job
creation is important to long-term
economic prospects—then targeted job

Notes
1. The long-run loss of earnings due to
unemployment is at least one-fifth of the
short-run effects. For example, displaced
workers suffer a 25 percent loss of earnings
in the year of displacement. Ten years later,
displaced workers still suffer a 6 percent
earnings loss (Stevens 1997). As another
example, graduating from college in a year
with 1 percent higher unemployment initially
reduces the graduate’s wages by 6 percent.
Fifteen years later, these unlucky graduates’
wages are still 2.5 percent lower (Kahn
forthcoming). As a final example, when state
employment declines, about two-thirds of the
drop is reflected initially in state residents
having a lower employment-to-population
ratio (one-third is reflected in lower state
population). After 17 years, the employmentto-population ratio in the state is still lower,
by about 25 percent of the initial shock to
employment (Bartik, 2001, pp. 141–145).
2. This is based on taking the midpoint
of the CBO’s November 2009 estimates
that such transfer payments have a GDP
multiplier somewhere between 0.8 and 2.2. I
also use the Council of Economic Advisers’
estimates (2009a) that a 1 percent increase
in GDP is needed to induce 1 million new
jobs. At current GDP levels of $14.2 trillion,
this implies a GDP per job created figure of
$142,000. Dividing by 1.5 yields $95,000.
3. The reason conventional fiscal stimulus
measures cost $100,000 per job created can
be explained intuitively: they only indirectly
boost job creation by increasing output
demand. Suppose one dollar of fiscal stimulus
increases demand for GDP by one dollar (a
multiplier of 1.0), and that a boost to GDP
increased job creation by the average ratio of
GDP to jobs, which is $105,000 (Council of
Economic Advisers 2009a). Then the cost per
job created of conventional fiscal stimulus
would be $105,000. Some conventional
fiscal stimulus may have multipliers greater
than 1, which would lower the cost per job
created. But boosts to GDP during a recession
may raise GDP by a greater percentage than
employment by increasing weekly work hours
and worker productivity per hour. Even with
fiscal multipliers of 1.5, it is difficult for the
cost per job created to be much less than
$100,000.
4. Based on CBO data, Bartik and Bishop
(2009) estimate fiscal benefits of 38 percent of
the GDP boost. If conventional fiscal stimulus
has a GDP-to-job created ratio of $105,000,
then fiscal benefits per job created will be 38
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percent of $105,000, which is around $40,000.
Targeted job creation proposals have lower
effects on GDP per job created, which reduces
their fiscal benefits to around $20,000 per job.
5. To create 0.9 million jobs through public
service jobs requires somewhat more job
slots. The model assumes some substitution
of public service job slots for jobs that would
have been created anyway, as well as some
multiplier effects of this spending for public
service jobs.
6. Personal communication between the
author and former MEED administrators.
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John A. Turner

employee tax deductible contributions.
Those contributions are permitted for
401(k) and DB plans for state and local
government employees. Extending tax
deductibility to private sector DB plan
participants would help level the playing
field between DB and 401(k) plans.
The increase in life expectancy
appears to have contributed to the decline
in DB plans, because DB plans are not
flexibile enough to deal readily with

Pension Policy
The Search for Better Solutions

T

he primary goals of the U.S.
pension system are to provide secure
and adequate retirement income and to
cover all or most workers. In each of
these respects, the system needs better
solutions. With the decline in defined
benefit (DB) plans and the increasing
reliance on 401(k) plans, future retirees
will have less secure and less adequate
retirement income than current retirees.
These issues are addressed in the book
Pension Policy: The Search for Better
Solutions, which was recently published
by the Upjohn Institute (see p. 7). This
article summarizes the main policy
recommendations from the book.
Policy Recommendations for
401(k) Plans
Since the 1980s, the role of 401(k)
plans has changed from being mainly
supplementary, offered by employers who
also offer a DB plan, to often being the
only plan employers provide. However,
401(k) plan regulation has lagged in
recognizing its increasingly important
role.
The regulation of 401(k) plans should
be changed so that two types of plans
would be recognized. First, 401(k)
retirement plans would be the primary or
sole plan provided by an employer and
would be regulated as retirement plans
rather than savings plans. The goal here
is to close the regulatory gap between
DB plans and 401(k) plans. For example,
the 401(k) retirement plan would be
required to offer an annuity as the default
payout option, with spousal consent
for not taking a joint and survivor’s
annuity, similar to the spousal protections
provided by DB plans.
The second type, a 401(k) savings
plan, would be offered by employers that
also offer DB plans meeting minimum
standards as to generosity. These plans
would continue to be regulated as they
currently are, reflecting their historical

roots as secondary plans that supplement
DB plans. Having this two-tier regulation
of 401(k) plans could encourage
employers to offer DB plans because it
would permit them to offer 401(k) plans
meeting less rigorous standards.
Participants in 401(k) plans often
unknowingly bear the plan’s investment
costs and typically also the administrative
costs. The fees they pay (in dollars), as
well as the expense ratio for investment
expenses, should be disclosed on annual
and quarterly account statements. This
type of disclosure is done in Australia
for administrative fees and by the Janus
mutual funds for investment costs.
While the focus of much pension
research is on inertia by pension
participants, a seldom discussed
problem with the coverage provided by

With the decline in defined
benefit plans, future retirees
will have less secure retirement
income than current retirees.
defined contribution plans is the lack of
persistency of contributions by many
workers. The lack of persistency explains
in part the surprisingly low account
balances that many 401(k) participants
have. Policy has not been developed to
address this problem.
Policy Recommendations for Defined
Benefit Plans
Some analysts consider the decline
in DB plans as an inevitable outcome
because those plans are unable to
adapt to a changing economic and
demographic environment. A number of
policies could be considered, however,
based on the view that their endangered
status is due in part to their regulatory
environment.
Private sector DB plans are the
only major type of pension plan in
the United States that does not permit

The role of 401(k) plans has
changed from being mainly
supplementary to often being
the only plan employers provide.
this continued rise in cost. In the United
States, some plans have reduced their
generosity, but generally this change is
only done for new hires and thus has
limited effect on the plan sponsor’s costs.
Life expectancy risk can be divided
into the idiosyncratic risk that a particular
individual will live longer than expected
and the cohort risk that an entire cohort
on average will live longer than expected.
Annuity providers are able to manage
idiosyncratic risk by pooling it across
large numbers of people, effectively
diversifying it away. However, cohort
risk cannot be pooled because it is
correlated across participants. Life
expectancy indexing of benefits is one
way of dealing with this risk. With
that approach, cohort risk is borne by
workers, who are the beneficiaries of the
improved life expectancy and thus are
best able to bear the risk.
A policy innovation, following the
Notional Defined Contribution plan
in Sweden, would be to permit life
expectancy indexing of benefits at
retirement. For each new retirement
cohort, the generosity of the plan would
be adjusted downward to reflect the trend
toward greater life expectancy. Under
current U.S. law, this innovation would
be prohibited because it would violate
the anticutback rule, which is defined
in terms of annual benefits. If that rule
were redefined to take an economist’s
perspective and use lifetime benefits as
the measure, life expectancy indexing
would not constitute a cutback in lifetime
benefits.
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The tax system could be used to
encourage broader coverage through DB
plans. For example, to tie the interests
of management to those of workers, the
allowable maximum income considered
for determining DB plan benefits could
be raised in plans that provide coverage
to all full-time workers. Another option
could require employers that provide a
DB plan for management to also provide
a similar plan for employees.
Workers in DB plans who are laid
off suffer losses on the benefits they
have already accrued. Their benefits
are frozen in nominal terms at layoff,
and the real value of those benefits is
eroded by inflation between that point
and the point at which they qualify for
retirement benefits. DB plans can make
these workers wait until age 65 to receive
benefits. For laid-off workers, the loss of
pension benefits can be more serious than

The fees that participants
pay (in dollars), as well as the
expense ratio for investment
expenses, should be disclosed
on annual and quarterly
account statements.
the loss of wages, while for employers
the loss of pension benefits gives them a
bonus for laying off workers.
One policy option is to require
firms that lay off workers in corporate
restructuring to price index the benefits
of those workers until retirement. This
obligation in a certain sense would not
impose a new cost on employers, it just
would mandate that they pay the benefits
to these workers that they had promised
to pay assuming continued employment.
Funding rules prohibit employers
from contributing to DB plans in years
that funding exceeds a certain level.
This requirement of zero contributions
generally occurs when the stock market
and companies are performing well.
Because pension plans are long-term
commitments, and because of the
fluctuations in the stock market, at a later
date plan sponsors then generally are
required to contribute. This requirement
generally occurs when the stock market
and companies are performing poorly.
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The temporal pattern of contributions
not only increases the volatility of
contributions, it forces plan sponsors to
contribute on a schedule that is exactly
opposite to what they would choose.
To reduce the volatility and timing
problem of employer contributions
for DB plan funding, the maximum
contribution requirements can be eased.
For example, plans could be allowed
to contribute 25 percent of the normal
cost any year, regardless of the level of
funding, thus allowing plan sponsors
to contribute every year. This is the
desired pattern for pension plans, which
are ongoing entities that are accruing
liabilities every year.
Losing track of pensions is a problem
for workers who are laid off or who
change jobs. It can be difficult for a
worker to find a pension from a former
employer, particularly if that employer
has gone out of business. Both the United
Kingdom and Australia have gone further
than the United States in assisting people

facing this problem. A national registry,
perhaps as an expansion of the registry
maintained by the Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation, would be an
improvement in this area.
Conclusions
Pension policy is an evolving
product of social institutions and the
economy. With the decline in DB plans
and the increasing role of 401(k) plans,
improvement is needed in the way
pensions are provided to U.S. workers.
The regulation of 401(k) plans needs
to be updated to recognize that they
generally are no longer supplementary
plans. Policies need to be enacted to
strengthen DB plans by making them
more flexible and improving the ways
they are funded.
John A. Turner is the director of the
Pension Policy Center.
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Pension Policy
The Search for
Better Solutions
John A. Turner
In his latest book, John A. Turner
tackles the current problems facing
pension policy for U.S. private sector
employerprovided
pension plans.
He provides
a thorough
overview
of defined
benefit, defined
contribution, and
hybrid retirement
plans; describes
the
in the current
h problems
bl
iinherent
h
pension system; and presents possible
solutions to those problems based on
lessons gleaned from the retirement
system experiences of more than a
dozen other industrialized countries.
Key policy issues addressed include:
• How can pension coverage be
increased?
• Should defined benefit plans be
saved, and if so, what can be done?
• How can annuitization be
increased in defined contribution
plans?
• How should pension policy adjust
to continuing increases in life
expectancy?
Readers seeking an overall
introduction to pension policy will be
rewarded by reading the book from
cover to cover; other readers may find
it more profitable to read individual
chapters for Turner’s analyses of issues
of particular interest. In either case,
this book offers specific solutions
aimed at improving pension policy, and
ultimately the lives of retirees, in the
United States and elsewhere.
243 pp. $40 cloth 978-0-88099-355-5
$20 paper 978-88099-354-8. 2010.

Human Resource
Economics and
Public Policy

Sustainable
Prosperity in the
New Economy?

Essays in Honor of
Vernon M. Briggs Jr.

Business Organization and
High-Tech Employment
in the United States

Charles J. Whalen, Editor
William Lazonick
“This marvelous book is not simply
a festschrift in honor of one of the
finest human resource economists on
the planet, but a
spectacular set of
well-researched
essays by leading
social scientists
reminding us of
the great debate
over the causes
of unemployment
and inequality
in U.S. labor
markets
k that
h first took place in the early
1960s. This volume’s first-rate analysis
of structural unemployment, training,
immigration policy, and the economics
of disability should not be missed.”
—Barry Bluestone, Dean, School
of Public Policy and Urban Affairs,
Northeastern University
“Vernon Briggs has long been
a prolific and influential scholar
advocating for progressive and humane
labor market policies. This book does
full justice to his career by including
wide-ranging and useful essays on
immigration, education, job training,
disability policy, and workforce
intermediaries. These chapters will
be of interest to both researchers and
policymakers as they consider how to
rebuild labor market institutions in the
face of the dramatic transformations
that we have witnessed in recent years.”
—Paul Osterman, Nanyang
Technological University Professor of
Human Resources and Management,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
305 pp. $40 cloth 978-0-88099-361-6
$20 paper 978-0-88099-359-3. 2010.

Can the United States refashion
its high-tech business model to
generate stable
and equitable
economic growth
and serve as an
example for how
other advanced
economies
can achieve
sustainable
prosperity? In
addressing this
key question, Lazonick provides
• historical analysis of the rise of the
“New Economy Business model”
(NEBM), from its beginnings in
Silicon Valley in the 1960s to the
Internet boom of the late 1990s;
• analysis of how important Old
Economy firms restructured in
attempts to transition from the
“Old Economy business model”
(OEBM) to NEBM;
• analysis of the relationship
between employment security and
retirement security under both
OEBM and NEBM; and
• a discussion of the implication for
sustainable prosperity of the rise
and dominance of NEBM.
Overall, this is a book that anyone
interested in the U.S. high-tech labor
force, the globalization of the ICT
industry, and, particularly, the means
by which an advanced economy can
achieve sustainable prosperity will find
indispensable.
357 pp. $45 cloth 978-0-88099-351-7
$25 paper 978-0-88099-350-0. 2009.
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